The threat of pollution gives momentum to international synergyWhile marine pollution and the emission of harmful gases into the atmosphere are major concerns for the marine industry, it was not always the case. In fact, at international level, some 60 years ago, the issue did not feature at all.
When the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was established in 1948 as one of the specialised agencies of the United Nations, the problem of marine pollution was not recognised and no reference was made to it in the convention that created the organisation.
This situation changed by the time the IMO became a practical reality in 1959 and it had some catching up to do.
Although no reference was made to pollution in the IMO Convention, by 1954 it was serious enough for the United Kingdom to take the initiative, like it did more than 40 years earlier with maritime safety after the Titanic disaster.
At the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, the OILPOL Convention was adopted.
The conference agreed that the IMO would assume responsibilities for the enforcement of the convention as soon as the IMO Convention itself entered into force.
In turn, the IMO arranged a conference in 1962, which adopted a number of amendments to the OILPOL Convention.
At that stage, maritime pollution from ships was seen as being limited to oil pollution. This was seen to be operational pollution. Tankers had to clean out their cargo tanks before taking on fresh cargo. This was done by washing the tank sides with water and then dumping the resulting slops into the sea. Bilge wastes from engine rooms were disposed of in the same way.
All that the 1962 amendments did, was to make it illegal to dump oily waste into the sea within 80 kilometres of land, and to introduce special areas where stricter limits applied. No attempt was made to restrict the amount of wastes that could be dumped into the sea, because at that time no alternative technology existed.
Accidental pollution was at that stage not considered at all, mainly because up until that point, there had never been a major oil spill.
But the maritime industry was heading for the age of the super tanker, and the IMO’s biggest challenge in this regard came in 1967 when the 130 000 deadweight ton tanker, the Torrey Canyon, ran aground off the coast of Cornwall in North West England, spilling her entire cargo of crude oil into the sea.
It was the world’s first major oil spill and the British government soon found itself under immense pressure to take action. Its response was to turn to the IMO to deal with an international problem.
Once again, the fact that the IMO existed as a permanent forum proved to be a major benefit. A plan of action was agreed upon and during the next few years, was put into effect.
Surprisingly, much of the IMO’s work in the immediate post-Torrey Canyon period involved legal matters. The disaster had shown that there was no internationally agreed means of responding either to accidents that had environmental implications, or for enabling compensation to be paid.
The IMO adopted a convention enabling a government to take action if an accident in international waters threatened its coastline with pollution. It also developed a two-tier system for compensating victims of such pollution.
The first stage would require the shipowner to pay compensation up to an agreed limit, which would depend upon the size of the ship involved. Once this limit was passed, further compensation would be provided by means of a special fund made up of contributions from oil importers.
Significantly, the IMO’s legal committee established to deal with these issues, remained after the initial crisis was over and eventually became a permanent body and recognised by an amendment to the IMO Convention.
From this point onwards, the protection of the marine environment became a major objective for the IMO, second only to its work in improving marine safety.
But, it was an indication of the state of technology at the time that the biggest change made to the OILPOL Convention after that original accident was designed to minimise operational, rather than accidental pollution.
This legalised the use of what was known as “load on top” – a way of reducing the amount of wastes resulting form tank-cleaning operations.
The Torrey Canyon disaster occurred at a time when awareness of the environment as a whole was developing rapidly, an evolution that was to culminate in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the environment, organised by the United Nations.
In the same year, the convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matter (the London Convention) was adopted at a conference, again called by the UK.
It was designed to control, and where possible, prevent the dumping into the sea of waste materials generated on land. Again, the IMO was made responsible for the convention when it entered into force in 1978.
In 1973, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted – a rather ambitious attempt to tackle not only oil pollution, but pollution from chemicals, substances carried in packaged form, sewage and garbage.
Annex 1 of this convention deals with oil pollution and contained measures designed to limit accidental, as well as operational pollution. The sub-committee established to deal with these and other environmental issues eventually, as with the legal committee, became a permanent part of the organisation’s structures under the name Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC).
The only problem was that over the years, it became difficult for the IMO to keep shipping regulations as topical as its member states needed. This led the procedure for the amendment of conventions.
Basically, this required parties to signify their acceptance of an amendment by submitting an appropriate legal instrument to the organisation, which generally involved some form of parliamentary procedure by the governments concerned.
This could sometimes take years, depending upon the interest that particular governments had in maritime matters and its general order of priorities.
Amendments also entered into force for the governments concerned only after being ratified by a specified number of parties involved – usually two-thirds.
This often became a problem when a large number of countries/parties were involved and particularly when the IMO’s membership started growing rapidly in the 1970s. Reaching the two-thirds threshold became difficult often.
This had serious implications, not only for the IMO, but also for the shipping industry as a whole. The industry was changing so rapidly that it was essential that none of the changes made should jeopardise safety.
The best way to ensure this was at the international level, but if the IMO was perceived as an organisation that could only adopt treaties that would become outdated within a few years, its usefulness would come under threat.
The solution was the introduction of what became known as “tacit acceptance.” Instead of requiring parties to signify their acceptance of amendments, it was assumed that it would force a future date, unless it was rejected, in the meantime by a fixed number of parties – usually one-third.
This article represents a minimally adapted extract from an article on the IMO website, www.imo.org
Mister Wong
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